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CORRESPONDENCE 
Of Two Minds About Law and Minds 
Larry Alexander* 
Present-oriented interpretation is an interpretive approach to legal 
texts that assigns them the best meaning, in terms of contemporary 
social policy, that they could plausibly convey were they written today 
rather than at the actual times of their enactment. Steven Smith has 
recently argued that present-oriented interpretation is a view of law in 
which law is literally "mindless."1 That is, present-oriented interpre-
tation would have us be ruled by the fortuity of what present meanings 
the words of a text can bear, whereas, according to Smith, we should 
be ruled by what the enacting political authorities actually decided 
furthers the public good. 
Although Smith's concerns about present-oriented interpretation 
in general are well taken, I shall argue that Smith is misleading in 
contrasting "mindless" present-oriented interpretation with the 
"mindful" originalism that he endorses. More specifically, I shall ar-
gue for two propositions: (1) Present-oriented interpretation is not 
completely mindless, and originalism is not completely mindful; both 
are mindless and mindful in similar ways. (2) Law will always connect 
with mind, but the tension between mindlessness and mindfulness in 
interpretive strategies is not illusory; rather, it reflects a tension within 
mind itself, the tension between reason and will. We want our law to 
be reasonable, but we must, in order to be reasonable, decide what 
reason requires. That means that our decisions - what we "will" -
must carry force independent of the reasons they attempt to reflect. 
On the other hand, any decision about what reason requires may look 
unreasonable from our present perspective. 
I 
Here is a brief sketch of Smith's attack on present-oriented inter-
pretation. Rule by past decisions of political authorities regarding the 
public good is "originalism." Rule by present decisions of political 
* · Professor of Law, The University of San Diego. B.A. 1965, Williams College; LL.B. 1968, 
Yale Law School. - Ed. I wish to thank Kevin Cole, Stan Krauss, Emily Sherwin, and Chris 
Wonnell for their helpful comments. 
1. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REv. 104, 117 (1989). 
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authorities regarding the public good is "pragmatism." Both original-
ism and pragmatism as approaches to interpretation oflegal texts have 
been subject to severe criticism, the former because it entrenches the 
decisions of past political authorities who may have only dimly or mis-
takenly perceived present needs and values, the latter because it en-
trenches no decisions of political authorities and thereby 
authoritatively "decides" nothing, depriving society of the values of 
repose and stability. 
Present-oriented interpretation purports to steer a middle-way be-
tween originalism and pragmatism and appropriate the virtues of both 
without the vices of either. The present-oriented interpretivist would 
have us be ruled by the morally best meaning we could give legal texts 
on the assumption that they had been authored at the time of our 
decision. Engaging in present-oriented interpretation will provide us 
with originalism's constraint and pragmatism's responsiveness to pres-
ent needs and values. 
Smith cites Ronald Dworkin and T. Alexander Aleinikoff as exam-
ples of present-oriented interpretivists.2 Dworkin would have courts 
take all the legal materials - the Constitution, statutes, regulations, 
and judicial decisions - and assume that they were all authored by 
the same lawgiver attempting to implement the morally best set of 
principles (by today's understanding) that "fit" with these materials. 
Aleinikoff restricts his application of present-oriented interpretation to 
statutes. He would have courts give statutes the morally best meaning 
that their words would carry today. 
Smith discusses at some length one of Aleinikoff 's examples, that 
of an immigration statute enacted in 1952 that excludes "[a]liens af-
flicted with psychopathic personality, epilepsy, or a mental defect."3 
If the question today is whether the statute excludes aliens who are 
homosexuals, the originalist would say "yes" because the enacting 
Congress would have so believed. The pragmatist on the other hand 
would consult present values, not the statute's language or the original 
Congress' intent (except as required by present values), and perhaps 
decide that the statute does not exclude homosexuals because it should 
not do so.4 The present-oriented interpretivist, unlike the pragmatist, 
2. Id. at 105 (citing R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory 
Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988)). 
3. Aleinikoff, supra note 2, at 48 (quoting Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 
414, 66 Stat. 163, 182 (1952)). 
4. Of course, a sophisticated pragmatist would factor in statutory language in determining 
the best result because of possible reliance on the language and other reasons. But language and 
past history, while potentially relevant to the pragmatist's decision, are not material considera-
tions for the pragmatist. 
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is constrained by the statute's language. If she shares the pragmatist's 
values and thinks it immoral or bad policy to exclude homosexuals, 
she would ask whether the contemporary meaning of the statutory 
terms such as "psychopathic personality" would perforce include 
homosexuals. If not, the present-oriented interpretivist would rule 
that the statute does not bar their entry.5 
II 
Smith argues that under present-oriented interpretation, legal texts 
represent no decision by any political authority, past or present. To 
engage in present-oriented interpretation of legal texts is, in a way, 
much like entrusting the fate of one's society to rule by entrails read-
ings or something similarly "mindless." It is not impossible to accom-
plish. But surely one needs to ask, as Smith does, why we should ever 
entrust our fate to a mindless process. 
I agree with much of Smith's criticism of present-oriented interpre-
tation. 6 Indeed, Smith's point would be strengthened by asking of 
present-oriented interpretivists why they would stick to the language 
chosen by the authors of the text. For example, Dworkin would inter-
pret an American statute to be the best it could be in English. But 
why should we be bound to English? Why not assume the marks on 
the text's pages are Esperanto or indeed some language we made up, 
so that the statute is as good a statute as we could have wanted? If the 
authors cannot bind us to the original meaning, why should they be 
able to bind us to the original language? 
III 
The preceding reductio illustrates two points that suggest that 
Smith has not identified the precise shortcoming of present-oriented 
interpretation. First, the problem with present-oriented interpretation 
that Smith identifies is not that it detaches law from the intentions of 
political authorities; the problem is, rather, that present-oriented inter-
pretation detaches laws from one particular intention, the authorities' 
intended meaning. The authorities who authored the text intended to 
enact certain marks. They intended those marks to be symbols in a 
5. See Smith, supra note 1, at 107-08. 
6. Indeed, I have made essentially the same criticism in my previous discussions of Ronald 
Dworkin's legal philosophy. Alexander, Striking Back at the Empire: A Brief Survey of 
Problems in Dworkin's Theory of Law, 6 LAW & PHIL. 419 (1987). I have asked why we should 
be governed by law that represents neither rules that authorities decided upon nor political/ 
moral principles that we presently hold to be correct, but rather, as Dworkin would have it, by 
law that represents the best principles that fit with past acts of authorities. 
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particular language. And they intended to convey a specific meaning 
through that language. Present-oriented interpretivists would focus 
on the second of these intentions (intended language) and make that 
intention authoritative, as opposed to originalists, who would make a 
third intention (intended meaning) authoritative. 7 Present-oriented 
interpretivists view law as an intentional delegation to the mindless 
procedure of linguistic evolution. 8 Both types of interpretivists, how-
ever, refer to (different) authorial intentions. 
The second point is. that the intentions of the authors operate at an 
indefinite number of levels of abstraction. This is a point that is now 
quite commonplace in debates over interpretation, but it is an impor-
tant one nonetheless. The originalist is not merely one who would 
have us be bound by authorial intentions. She would have us be bound 
by those intentions characterized in a relatively concrete rather than 
an abstract manner. 
But this point shows the originalist to be vulnerable to an objection 
very similar to the one Smith levels against the present-oriented inter-
pretivist. The originalist argues that we should be bound by the con-
crete intentions of the political authorities who authored the legal 
texts. But why should we be bound by the authorities' concrete inten-
tions rather than their abstract intentions, which, at the most abstract 
level, were the intentions to achieve good and just government? The 
authorities saw no conflict between their concrete and abstract inten-
tions. Their concrete intentions furthered their abstract intentions, or 
so they believed. If time, circumstances, or a reassessment of facts or 
values leads us to conclude that a conflict exists between the authori-
ties' concrete intentions and their abstract intentions, why should we 
honor the former rather than the latter? 
The point can be put in terms quite similar to Smith's. The au-
thorities' concrete intentions are what they have collectively decided 
upon ("will") as means to advance their most abstract intentions (to 
do what is just and good - "reason"). From the authorities' perspec-
tive, "will" and "reason" are joined. From our present point of view, 
however, what was willed may be at odds with what reason dictates.9 
7. See generally Moore, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 107, 
115-18 (1989); Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 
416-17 (1989). 
8. Of course, not all linguistic evolution is mindless. The change in meaning of words that 
refer to "natural kinds" arguably reflects a better understanding of the reality to which those 
words refer. See Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 291-
301 (1985). 
9. See generally Alexander, Modern Equal Protection Theories: A Metatheoretical Taxonomy 
and Critique, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 6-7 (1981); Alexander, Painting Without the Numbers: 
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If so, then the originalist would have us be governed by "unreasoned 
will." And is the originalist's "unreasoned will" any better than the 
present-oriented interpretivist's "mindless law"? 
IV 
The pragmatist, who advocates that we should always follow "rea-
son" (or, in the language of authorial intent, the most abstract charac-
terization of that intent), might appear now to have the upper hand in 
this jurisprudential debate. And surely there is something unassailable 
in the prescription to follow reason. But there is also something quite 
assailable in it. For reason itself will dictate that we be able to decide 
issues of governance, resolve them, which means that we cannot con-
tinually revisit the reasonableness of the resolution we will. Reason-
able law, the law of the pragmatist, requires authority, rules, decisions 
- "will."10 It is as bad to be ruled by reason without will as it is to be 
ruled by will without reason. The pragmatist may (pragmatically) opt 
for originalism. 11 
Indeed - and here we come full circle - if the pragmatist has 
"reason" to opt for originalism's version of "will" because rule of law 
virtues must figure in the pragmatist's calculations, the pragmatist 
might have stronger reason to opt for the "mindless law" of present-
oriented interpretation. Adverting to the political authorities' inten-
tion to couch its will in a particular language - the authoritative in-
tention for present-oriented interpretation - may serve the rule-of-
law virtues better than adverting to the authorities' intended concrete 
meaning.12 After all, languages change very slowly. Present diction-
ary meanings will likely be both close to the authors' original mean-
ings and at the same time much more accessible to those persons who 
must seek guidance from and be constrained by the law. (Of course, 
we can always ask whether, if a word has changed meanings, it really 
is the same word that the authors chose or is instead a new and un-
chosen word represented by the chosen symbols. However we answer 
this question, the point remains that making the word's present die-
Noninterpretive Judicial Review, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 447, 452 (1983); Alexander, The Consti· 
tution as Law, 6 CONST. COMMENT. 103, 112-13 (1989). 
10. See Alexander, The Constitution as Law, supra note 9, at 108-10; Alexander, Constrained 
by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 48-53 (1989). 
11. See Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, supra note 10, at 48-53. 
12. Smith misleadingly characterizes present-oriented interpretation as divorced from the 
collective decision, the "mind," that underlies the text. Smith, supra note 1, at 111-12, 115. But 
the choice of particular words in a particular language as the instruments for achieving policy 
goals, which is the significant choice for the present-oriented interpreter, is itself the product of a 
mindful collective decision. Present-oriented interpretation is not any more mindless than 
originalism. Its focus is merely on a different authorial intention. 
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tionary meaning authoritative may serve the rule of law considerations 
better than making its originally intended meaning authoritative.) 
The real difficulty with present-oriented interpretation, aside from 
the potential conflict with reason which it shares with originalism, is 
one pointed out by Smith. The outcome of present-oriented interpre-
tation depends upon the fortuity of the authors' choice of words, a 
choice that at the time may have been a matter merely of style or taste 
or perhaps chance, not a matter of substance.13 Of course, originalism 
faces a similar difficulty when an unforeseen change in circumstances 
or an improved understanding of the world leads one to view the origi-
nally intended result as perverse.14 In a sense, both originalism and 
present-oriented interpretation are vulnerable to fortuities, albeit dif-
ferent ones. 
That is the nature of our jurisprudential dilemma. Dworkin's par-
ticular version of law without mind is not a way out, a point on which 
Smith and I agree. I reject Dworkin's theory of law, not because it is 
mindless, but because, as I argue elsewhere, it serves neither reason nor 
the rule of law virtues. 15 On the other hand, Aleinikoff's version of 
present-oriented interpretation does serve rule-of-law virtues, though 
it must confront the problem of fortuitous language choice that Smith 
identifies.16 In any event, laws always connect with minds at some 
point. The real issue is tha~ laws with mind present us with a paradox, 
the "will" aspect of mind and the "reason" aspect being both comple-
mentary and antagonistic. And we ourselves are of two minds about 
this. 
13. Id. at 115-16. 
14. See Moore, supra note 8, at 291-301. 
15. See supra note 6. 
16. Smith, supra note 1, at 115-16. 
